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Yet our knowledge remains limited of whether this transfer of R&D has been associated with greater technological generation from new countries to a significant extent.
However, we also live in times when the unprecedented globalisation of the last two decades is under threat. On the one hand, researchers concerned with the development of poor countries in Africa are campaigning for Developed Market Economies to open a larger part of their market. Larger developing countries such as India and Brazil have also intervened aggressively for a fair deal in trading during the Doha and Cancun rounds of the WTO negotiations. On the other hand, recent trends in the outsourcing of intellectual labour have given rise to the fear in Developed Market Economies that they stand to lose their comparative advantage in knowledge-intensive products as new countries emerge with the basic capabilities needed to provide some technology-based services. At least two recent works on international trade by eminent economists argue that these fears may be well founded. Gomroy and Baumol (2000) show that in a multi-country, multi-product 1 US Department of Commerce as cited in Beausang (2004) , Table 1. 1 setting where international trade is based mostly on created comparative advantages and economies of scale, the terms of trade consequences of productivity improvements among trading partners may be such that the classical argument that free trade benefits all countries is overturned. In a similar vein, Samuelson (2004) has argued that productivity growth in trading partners may sometimes 'permanently harm' the trading country.
These concerns about the possibilities and consequences of productivity growth in trading partners are also closely related to the discussion of technological catch-up of developing economies, especially in the context of North-South trade. Increases in productivity in developing economies often start with simple technology transfer type activities, facilitated by openness and then proceed through investments by firms in capability building (within economies of the South) to become distinctive niches that underlie the competitive advantages of these nations.
Our paper speaks to these audiences and their concerns. It provides a quantitative assessment of the periods when new countries emerged as technology producers (thus demonstrating technological catch-up), and assesses how different phases and dimensions of technological catch-up are related to globalisation. We distinguish between the earlier phases of technological catch-up that rely on the building of simpler capabilities, the outcome of which forms part of what is measured by cross-border licensing revenues, and the attainment of higher level technology based competitiveness, which can be captured by the inventive sources of patenting. The paper also pays attention to different dimensions of globalisation in the world economy -openness to trade, share of foreign direct investment (FDI), the use of international locations as sources for patenting by multinational corporations (MNCs), and the proportion of the world's population that migrated between countries.
There are two reasons to expect that the relationship between technological catchup and globalisation varies with whether countries are at earlier stages of development that require simpler capabilities, or have entered a more mature phase of development that relies on sophisticated capabilities. First, when building simpler capabilities smaller firms may play a more prominent independent entrepreneurial role, and there is less need for organisational complexity and interconnected network structures. Therefore, earlier technological catch-up relies less upon a system for sustained and continuous international knowledge exchanges and interdependencies (of the kind that are facilitated by trade and FDI), but depends more in the first instance upon indigenous learning efforts. Second, the recent rise in technology trade and the outsourcing of knowledge-related functions that has accompanied the fragmentation of value chains has created new opportunities for those with at least basic capabilities in what were formerly less well internationally interconnected locations, especially in developing countries. Some countries with basic capabilities may thus now be able to establish new niches for themselves in international knowledge creation that does not depend on an already prevailing system of trade and FDI. Indeed, our empirical findings suggest a strong role for increasing inward direct investment in the world economy as a factor inducing the emergence of new countries as patentees (which usually does require international knowledge interdependencies), but only some ambiguous evidence that greater openness to international trade explains the recent surge of new countries as licensors in the world economy. We interpret the latter finding as suggestive of the important role played by exogenous factors such as the emergence of generic technologies that have facilitated the growth of technology trade often in intangibles as argued by Athreye (1998) and Arora et al (2001) . However, patenting by MNCs from international sources (that is, from the innovative efforts of their subsidiaries abroad) is enhanced by a weakening of the possibilities for trade. This may be because 3 when openness to trade declines, host countries rely to a greater extent on a local presence by the subsidiaries of foreign-owned MNCs to foster technology creation, as opposed to international business knowledge linkages that come through trade and subcontracting.
However, when international knowledge linkages are created through FDI, it facilitates the consolidation of higher level capabilities locally, even though FDI is not usually the means by which lower level capabilities are initially built up in the earlier stages of development.
Taken together, these findings are consistent with the view that multinationals require the presence of local capabilities and infrastucture before they invest (Lall, 2001) , and that they tend in recent times to have followed knowledge-based asset-seeking strategies to reinforce their competitive strengths as argued by authors such as Cantwell (1995) , Dunning (1996) , Makino et al (2002) , Pearce (1999) and Wesson (2005) .
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: A brief review of the literature on the emergence of new technology producing countries and regions in Section 1, is followed in Section 2 by an outline of the method employed in our study, including a description of the method used to track technological catch-up in the world economy.
Section 3 describes our main results and Section 4 concludes.
Factors influencing the emergence of new technology producing regions
The influence of globalisation and human capital on the technological capacities of a country is widely acknowledged in the literature on technology and development. Yet globalisation has a dual dimension in the way that it influences the emergence of new technology producers that is not often addressed in this literature. The rates of growth of exports and imports in the global economy provide or close a demand opportunity for all countries -this may be especially important in poorer countries where low incomes may 4 cause domestic markets to be small to start with. Periods of relatively greater openness are therefore also often periods where the world economy enjoys a boom in demand as a result of growth in incomes of trading countries. This growth of demand may contain new technological opportunities inasmuch as technological opportunity is dependent both upon the novelty of product demand and a large scale of operations. Globalisation in this first sense provides the preconditions for the generation of technology within developing countries and is one dimension that underlies what we study in this paper -namely, through the measure of the openness of the world economy to trade.
The second dimension of globalisation (and the more widely studied one) is the ability of countries to exploit such demand booms. Here supply-side factors such as levels of infrastructure, stocks of human capital and existing technological capacity condition the influence of openness. Whilst openness allows opportunities to import capital goods and technology-embodied products, human capital, and linkages to demanding users such as foreign-owned firms may well play an important role in the exploitation of the opportunities offered by openness, but the capacity to exploit these advantages may also vary with dynamic firm capabilities and the institutional infrastructure of the country.
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This second dimension is thus quite distinct from the first dimension, but is reflected in the geographical dispersion by multinational companies of their subsidiary sources of technological knowledge creation.
An important factor emphasised in the literature on the emergence of technology producing regions is that such regions embody 'untraded' competencies (Storper 1997) which includes technology generating economic and social institutions. Other studies have also highlighted the role of human capital and training and the inertia associated with such labour in some regions. Thus, studies on the emergence of new science based regions such as those by Bresnahan and Gambardella (2004) , Arora and Gambardella (2005) It is also argued that the emergence of general purpose technologies, such as IT and biotechnology have created conditions in which new technology markets have emerged (Athreye 1998, Arora, Gambardella and Fosfuri, 2001) . Key parts of this argument relate to the role of technological convergence (facilitated by the emergence of generic technologies) in creating a large scale of market, the lowered costs of experimentation due to easier trial and error (for example through the widespread use of computer aided simulation) and the emergence of new languages that allow some hitherto tacit knowledge to be codified. The emergence of these new markets however represents a changing division of labour where newer nations have a chance to specialise narrowly and emerge as technology producers. Some work from the study of patent data seems to support this 3 These case studies also emphasise the large and coordinated investments by numerous agents in the economy required to achieve success in technological catch-up and the role of indigenous institutions in imparting unique advantages to nations. It is beyond the scope of the aggregated level of analysis of this paper to examine these aspects of technological catch-up, though we think such factors do affect the intercountry differences in catch-up.
6 conclusion. For example, Cantwell and Vertova (2004) find that the technological diversification of nations has declined in recent years and from this they conclude that newer countries have different opportunities for catch-up when compared to earlier periods because they can afford to catch-up through a much narrower specialisation.
Thus, in assessing the factors due to which new countries emerge as technology producers in the world economy, we need to take account of the openness of the world economy, the movement of inward direct investment and migration as well as the growth and variation of the stock of human capital. In addition, the technological developments in the fields of IT and biotechnology may exercise an independent influence because the development of these fields has opened up huge opportunities for niche technologies based on recombination which many new countries with sufficient human capital can exploit.
While these technological developments are not directly measurable, their influence has been noted in several studies since the late 1980s on the growing importance of the knowledge-based economy. 
Data and Methodology employed
The interrelationship between trade, foreign direct investment, human capital and economic growth, implies the challenge in statistically testing some of the relationships at the country level lies in overcoming the biases introduced by endogeneity in the statistical models. Consequently, disentangling their influence on growth and then on technological catch-up is problematic. In this paper we construct an aggregated measure of technological catch-up that does not depend upon growth measures in a direct way. This allows us to bypass some of the endogeneity issues to do with technology and growth. However, the interrelatedness between processes of globalisation and technology generation remains an 4 See for example, Foray and Lundvall (1996) and Antonelli (1998). important issue. Thus technology generation may respond to the demand opportunities created by openness while international producers may flock to regions of technological advantage. We use time series techniques to address these issues of interrelatedness and to assess the direction of statistical causality. This comes at a cost however, since we also lose much of the variation across countries in the data which we could exploit. Thus, one implication of the methodology we employ is that we cannot say very much about individual cases of success or failure of economies to emerge as technology producers.
Data used in the analysis

Measuring technological catch-up
We use two measures to evaluate a country's contribution to the production of technology in the world economy. The first is a country's share of patents issued by the USPTO that are attributable to all non-US inventors, and the second is a country's share of licensing revenues in the world economy.
The USPTO database has advantages and disadvantages in the analysis of technological behaviour and these have been widely discussed in the literature using patent data. 5 For our purposes a major advantage is that it helps us track the presence across countries of advanced technology generating capabilities. However, the US patent share of countries is an underestimate of the overall technological capacity of countries, which includes more basic capabilities that are less likely to be associated with the kinds of knowledge creation that gives rise to patenting. It may also be biased towards areas of industry which are dominant in US imports. For these reasons, US patents provide an overrepresentation of innovation in advanced manufacturing and in areas for which the US market may be important, but they are a poor representation of innovation of a simpler kind, in services and of technology trade that does not involve the US (e.g. trade between
5 See e.g. Schmookler, 1950 , 1966 , Pavitt, 1985 , 1988 Griliches, 1990; Archibugi, 1992. 8 two developing countries). Since the mid-1980s, knowledge intensive services have been increasing in importance for economic activity with several new countries becoming involved in technology trade in these fields (e.g. software exports from India). For this reason we also use the share of a country in international royalty and licensing revenues as a second measure of their technological generation capacity. This better reflects earlier stages of the development process and other aspects of innovations that have arisen in more recent industrial history (most notably, innovation in services).
While patents can be used to generate licensing revenues, licensing can also happen without the issuance of patents. Licensing is the more prevalent way of trading technology-based business services between firms. However, it should be noted that unlike US patents, licensing revenues are probably far more influenced by local institutional conditions, transfer pricing practices of multinationals, and bilateral trade ties -factors that we will lose sight of in the high level of aggregation of our data.
The emergence of new countries as technology producers should result in a greater dispersion of technology shares as measured by indices of concentration like the Herfindahl. We compute the Herfindahl index of concentration using the following definition
where S it is the technology share of the ith country at time t. We then exploit a particular decomposition of the Herfindahl index, which splits the change in overall concentration into a turbulence effect and a regression effect.
In equation (2), the first term of the RHS measures technology share turbulence (the concentration of the change in shares). Both positive and negative changes have the same weight in this index and the larger the value of the turbulence the more changes there will have been in technology shares. By construction the turbulence measure is always positive.
The second term is however, the more interesting one for tracking technological catch-up by new countries. It measures the linear association between initial technology share and the change in that share, weighting large initial shares more than small ones. We call this the Inverse Regression Index (IRI), since negative values imply a regression of country shares towards the mean.
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Negative values of the inverse regression effect come about when countries that had initially larger technology shares are also those with negative values of ∆S it , (i.e. when these countries lose technology shares). When technology producers with small initial shares have gained or lost patent shares these are given a smaller weight and the cross term will have a smaller positive value than if the same were to happen to large patentees.
As new countries begin to make small gains in technology shares and erode the shares of existing nations they cause lower positive values for the turbulence term and a negative value for the inverse regression index. When some already dominant existing countries are increasing their technology shares both terms will be positive and higher. In general, turbulence tends to be greatest when it is the largest countries that make significant gains and losses against one another, since at that end changes in shares tend to be higher in absolute terms.
We use the IRI term as the dependent variable in a time series analysis to capture the existence of technological catch-up. Thus, we compute two IRI measures-one based on patent shares of countries (IRIP) and the second based on licensing (revenue) shares of countries (IRIL) and use these as the variables in our analysis.
2 The globalisation variables
The data for the globalisation variables are drawn by aggregating the data over countries from well-known data sources and these are detailed in the Appendix to this paper. We use four measures of globalisation in the world economy:
(i) Openness to trade as measured by the ratio of exports and imports to total world income (OPEN);
(ii) The ratio of inward FDI stock to gross world income (IFDI); We also looked at the possibility of including measures of human capital such as the share of tertiary educated population in the world economy, and the variance in the share of tertiary educated population in the world economy. However the earliest period for which such data became available in a consistent fashion was from 1970 and the data were available only for five yearly intervals. Given the relatively short span (for a time series analysis) we decided not to include these variables but to use an econometric methodology capable of controlling for the influence of such omitted factors. [ Table 1 here]
Augmented Dicky Fuller tests (with a trend and intercept) were used to determine whether a variable was stationary or trended. The order of integration of all the explanatory variables, reported in Table 2 , indicate non-stationary in all the globalisation variables. Since the IRI is constructed by decomposing the difference of the Herfindahl index for patents and licensing shares, it is stationary to start with. We thus used first differences of the globalisation variables along with IRIL and IRIP (in levels) for our estimation.
[ Table 2 here]
[ Figure 1 here] Figure 1 plots the main trends in the explanatory variables we considered, while Table 3 reports the correlation matrix of explanatory variables. Figure 1 shows a rising trend in all the explanatory variables though the levels of OPEN, IFDI and INTPAT seem considerably higher than the values for PROPMIG. The correlation matrix also shows that the globalisation variables are very highly correlated in levels. De-trending the data by differencing we find the correlations are still evident but much more manageable for estimation purposes.
[ Table 3 here]
Econometric methodology
We use a Vector autoregressive system of equations (VAR henceforth) to model the inter-relationship between the emergence of new technology producers and globalisation in the world economy. The estimated VAR takes the form: [ Figure 2 here] 8 A popular classroom example of this is that it can be shown that weather forecasts granger cause the weather! 9 These numbers exclude the US as a country of invention, which is (of course) the major patentee in the USPTO dataset. Thus, the patent share of the US alone was over 90% in 1950 and fell over time, but was still high at 55% in 1995. To get a clearer picture about the role of new countries in patenting, we consider all foreign invented patents issued by the USPTO -i.e. we exclude US invented patents. See the Appendix for details about the patenting data used in the study. [ Figure 3 here] However, it is the shares of technology generation that went to these newer countries that are important -were they large enough to make a dent on the shares of the technological leaders? Figure 4 below plots the IRI term of equation (3) for both licensing shares and patent shares. Since patent numbers vary widely year-on-year they can cause individual patent shares to fluctuate widely. The variations in licensing revenues are even wider. To smooth the data for these variations we also plot a three period moving average for the two IRI terms.
[ Figure 4 here] In both cases, there was relatively little turbulence in the cross-country distribution, and so the changes in the Herfindahl index were mostly due to changes in the Inverse Regression Index. As we explained in Section 2.1 this is an indication that new countries have emerged as significant technology producers. Studies of the Four Dragons and Japan for example, show the role of openness and foreignowned firms in technology acquisition and the technological capability building process (Hobday, 1995) . The results on licensing suggest that with basic capabilities openness to trade is more important than the attraction of FDI. In the earlier stages of development international business linkages can take a variety of forms (such as the export of components to MNC networks under subcontracting agreements). This is also consistent with the view that the opportunities offered by the growth of technology trade have opened up a new potential amongst certain countries to take advantage of some established capabilities through knowledge service provision that need not be tied to FDI networks.
Results of the VAR estimation
Put differently, the growing division of innovative labour between countries may be based as much upon a widening of the kinds of comparative advantage of nations that are relevant to knowledge provision, as it is upon the availability of new technological opportunities as such. Secondly, as we noted earlier licensing is more sensitive to local institutional and governance factors. These factors would exercise less influence on patenting through the USPTO. The aggregated measures for the world economy effects that we use in this analysis would not be able pick up individual country level processes.
Assessing Granger Causality
We turn now to the Granger causality tests that reported in Further, though periods of globalisation in the world economy have also always thrown up new technology producers in the world economy -this has often been relatively few new countries.
Summary and conclusions
In this paper we use measures of technological catch-up in the world economy to try Studying the impact of globalisation in explaining the emergence of new producers of technology we again find dissimilar results for patenting and licensing (revenue) shares.
In the case of patenting we find evidence that inward foreign direct investment matters in the emergence of new technology producers with the higher level capabilities needed.
MNC patenting from international sources and international migration also matter -they promote concentration of patent shares, and thus constrain the incidence of higher levels of technological catch-up across countries. Looking at licensing shares however, the influence that runs from greater openness in the world economy to the emergence of new countries as licensees does not appear to be robust, as it holds only in our VAR analysis and not in the tests of Granger causality. 1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Receipts Note: All tests are significant at the 5% level of significance The patent shares we use are the share of each country in the patents issued every year by the USPTO that are attributable to all non-US inventors. The total number of patents in each year is shown in Figure A1 below. Dunning & Cantwell (1987) .
The proportion of international patents was computed by identifying the patents held by large foreign-owned firms that were attributable to subsidiary sources of invention outside their respective home countries. We aggregated these data, available by host country and year 
